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The Committee was established by the  1957 Rome 
Treaties in order to  involve the  various economic and 
social interest groups in  the establishment of the com-
mon market and  to  provide the institutional machinery 
for briefing the Commission and the Council on all mat-
ters relating to the Community. 
The Single European Act ( 1986) and the Maastricht 
Treaty (1992) reinforced the ESC's role. 
Membership 
The Committee has 222  members (195 men, 27 women) 
representing economic and social interest groups in  Eu-
rope.  Members are nominated by national governments 
and appointed by the Council of the European Union for 
a renewable 4-year term of office. They belong to one of 
three Groups:  Employers (Group I  - President:  Manuel 
Eugenio CA  V ALEIRO BRANDAO - Portugal). Work-
ers (Group II - President: Tom JENKINS - United King-
dom). Various Interests (Group III - President: Beatrice 
RANGONI MACHIAVELLI - Italy). Germany, France. 
Italy  and  the United Kingdom have 24 members each. 
Spain has 21. Belgium, Greece, the Netherlands. Portu-
gal, Austria and Sweden 12,  Denmark, Ireland and Fin-
land 9 and Luxembourg 6. 
The Members' Mandate 
The ESC members'  main task is to issue Opinions on 
matters referred  to  the  Committee by the Commission 
and the Council. 
It should be  noted that the ESC is the only body of its 
type which advises the EU Council of Ministers directly. 
Advisory Role 
Consultation of the  Committee hy the Commission or 
the Council is mandatory m certain cases; in others it is 
optional. The Committee may.  however. also adopt 
Opinions on its own initiative.  Both the Single Act 
(17.2.86) and the Maastricht Treaty (7.2.92) extended 
the  range of issues which must be referred to the Com-
mittee. in particular the new policies (regional and envi-
ronment policy). On  average the ESC delivers  180 
Opinions a year (of which I 0% are Own-initiative Opin-
ions).  All Opinions are forwarded  to the Community's 
decision-making bodies and then published in  the EC's 
Official Journal. 
Information ancl Integration Role 
Over the last few years the ESC has stepped up its role 
in  the European Union and has transcended the straight-
forward  duties flowing  from the  Treaties.  Providing a 
fomm tor the  Single Market,  the  ESC has. in  conJunc-
tion  with other Community Institutions, organized a 
number of events designed to Improve links between the 
general public In  Europe and the European In~titutions. 
Internal organization 
1. Presidency and Bureau 
Every two years the Committee elects a Bureau made up 
of 36 member~ ( 12  per Group). and a President and two 
Vice-Presidents chosen from each of the three Groups Ill 
rotation. 
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The President is responsible for the orderly conduct of 
the Committee's business.  He is assisted in the dis-
charge of his duties by the Vice-Presidents who deputize 
for him in the event of his absence. 
The President represents the Committee in  relations with 
outside bodies. 
Joint briefs: relations with EFTA CEEC. AMU, ACP 
countries, Latin America and other third countries fall 
within the remit of the Committee Bureau and President. 
The Bureau's main task is  to organize and coordinate 
the work of the Committee's various bodies and to Jay 
down the political guidelines for this work. 
2. Sections 
The Committee has nine Sections: 
Economic, Financial and Monetary Questions -
secretariat tel. 546.94.71 
(President: Jean Pardon- Group I- Belgium) 
- External Relations. Trade and Development Policy -
secretariat tel. 546.93.16 
(President: Roger Briesch- Group II- France) 
- Social. Family, Educational and Cultural Affairs-
secretariat tel. 546.93.02 
(President: John F. Carroll- Group 11- Ireland) 
Protection of the Environment, Public Health and 
Consumer Affairs -
secretariat tel. 546.92.27 
(President: Manuel Atafde Ferreira- Group III- Portugal) 
- Agriculture and Fisheries -
secretariat tel. 546.93.96 
(President: Perc Margalef Masia- Group Ill- Spain) 
- Regional Development and Town and Country Planning -
secretariat tel. 546.92.57 
(President: Robert Moreland- Group III- United Kingdom) 
- Industry, Commerce, Crafts and Services-
secretariat tel. 546.93.85 
(President: Liam Connellan- Group I- Ireland) 
- Transport and Communications -
secretariat tel. 546.93.53 
(President: Rene Bleser- Group II- Luxembourg) 
- Energy, Nuclear Questions and Research-
secretariat tel. 546.97.94 
(President: Jose Ignacio Gafo Fernandez- Group I- Spain) 
3. Study Groups 
Section Opinions are drafted by Study Groups compris-
ing an  average of 12  members. including a Rapporteur. 
who may be assisted by experts (usually  four with a 
maximum of six). 
4. Sub-Committees 
Where appropriate, the Committee can set up a  tempo-
rary sub-committee. which operates on the same lines as 
Sections. 
5. Plenary Session 
The Committee meets in  Plenary Session as  1  rule  ten 
times a  year.  At the  Plenary Sessions. Opinions are 
adopted on the basis of Section Opinions by a simple 
maJority. They are forwarded to the institutions and pub-
lished in  the Official Journal of the European Commum-
ties. 
6. Relations with economic and social councils 
The ESC maintains regular links with regional  and na-
tional economic and social councils throughout the Euro-
pean Union. These links mainly involve exchanges of in-
formation and joint discussions every year on specific is-
sues. 
Moreover. the ESC maintains similar contacts world-
wide with other economic and social councils in the "In-
ternational Meetings" held every two years. 
7. Relations with economic and social interest groups 
in third countries 
The Committee has links with economic and social inter-
est groups in  a  number of non-member countries and 
groups of countnes, including Mediterranean countries. 
the  ACP countries, Central and Eastern Europe, Latin 
America and EFT  A. For this purpose the Committee sets 
up  15-30 man delegations headed by the President. For 
links with  the  countries of Central and Eastern Europe. 
some meetings will be institutionalized under the Euro-
pean Agreements. 
Meetings 
The average number of meetings held each year is as fol-
lows: 
Plenary Sessions  10 
Sections  70 
Study Groups  350 
Group meetings  85 
Meetings of sub-groups recognized 
by the three Groups  160 
Miscellaneous  370 
Visitors' groups (approx. 8.000 visitors)  200 
TOTAL  1,245 
Publications 
The ESC regularly distributes a number of publications 
free of charge (Order in writing by mail or fax  -
546.98.22) inter alia its main Opinions in brochure for-
mat and a monthly newsletter. 
Secretariat-General 
The Committee is serviced by a  Secretariat-General. 
headed by a  Secretary-General. reporting to the Chair-
man representing the Bureau. 
The number of officials (including temporary and auxil-
iary staff) is as follows: 
Category A (Administrators) 
Category B 
(administrative assistants) 
Category C  (secretarial 
and clerical staff) 
Category D 
(skilled employees) 
Language Service 
59 (48 men, 11  women) 
65 (25 men, 40 women) 
237 (59 men. 178 women) 
48 (36 men, 12 women) 
121  (67 men, 54 women) 
Total: 530 (235 men, 295 women). more than a third of 
whom are involved in  language work. given the need to 
operate in the Community's 11  official languages.  How-
ever. as of I  January  1995. the Economic and Social 
Committee and the Committee of the Regions will share 
a common core of services. drawing the bulk of their 
manpower from the ESC's secretariat. 
1995 Budget 
The  1995  Budget appropriations total ECU 83.900,000. 
of which ECU 57.800,000 have been eannarked for the 
joint services which the ESC shares with the Committee 
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PROCEDURE 
On 17 September 1994, the Economic and Social Committee decided, in accordance 
with article 26 of its Rules  of Procedure,  to  enable its Section for  External Relations,  Trade and 
Development Policy to draw up  an Information Report on: 
Relations between the European  Union and the United States. 
The preparatory work for  this  Report was  carried  out by the  following  members 
assisted by the Rapporteur's and the Group Experts whose names are given below: 
President:  Mr 
Rapporteur:  Mrs 
Members:  Mr 
Mr 
Mr 
Mr 
Mr 
Mr 
Mr 
Mr 
Mr 
Mr 
Experts: 
For the Rapporteur: 
For Group I 
For Group II 
For Group III 
van DIJK 
DAVISON 
ANDRADE 
BAEZA 
EWERT 
GADDER 
GIESECKE 
LIVE  RANI 
PAPAMICHAIL 
PELLETIER R. 
PEZZINI 
POMPEN 
Mr  WOOLCOCK 
Mr  ROMOLI 
Mr  ZELLHOEFER 
Mrs  O'NEILL 
The Study Group met on three occasions: 
18 January 1995 
8 March 1995 
24 May  1995. 
In  connection with the  work of the  study group,  a Committee  delegation visited 
Washington from 3-6 April 1995. 
The Information Report was adopted by the Section on 6 July 1995 by a majority vote 
and two abstentions. 
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SU1fi1TIIlTY 
The US is the EU,s most important trading partner and the two-sluue commnnfundamental principles. 
The  end to  the  Cold  War  signals less  emphasis  on  security  cooperation  and more  on  economic 
cooperation and the Uruguay Round created a framework for deepening EU-US trade relations. The 
EU-US trade flow is more or less balanced and 95% of  that trade is trouble free.  The EU is no longer 
standing accused as  "fortress Europe" and there are moves towards transatlantic free trade.  With the 
US temporarily focused on domestic issues, it would be helpful for the EU to take the initiative on EU-
US relations.  Where trade differences between the EU and US keep resurfacing,  it is largely due to 
different traditions in regulatory policy and to the different perspectives of  the various interest groups 
on either side of  the Atlantic. Transatlantic cooperation between economic and social interest groups, 
extending from the business dialogue which is currently being promoted,  would have the benefit of 
deepening a dialogue which to date has been largely carried out by a relatively small group of  experts 
in the political and security community.  Progress could be envisaged particularly on the essentially 
technical subjects of  regulatory policy, including standards and the important area of  environmental  , 
protection. 
Overcoming  remaining  difficulties  between  the  US  and  the  EU is  also  important for  the  full 
involvement of  Japan in world trade and for a combined effort to help developing countries. The close 
interaction between  economic  and security  concerns  also  means a growing  role for transatlantic 
cooperation on conflict prevention. 
* 
*  * 
1.  Introduction 
1.1.  For nearly fifty  years  the  transatlantic relationship  between the  United States  and 
Western Europe was based on a common security interest. There were shared common fundamental 
principles, historic, cultural links and growing economic interdependence. But the foundations of the 
relationship were in a common security interest. The end of the Cold War has brought a shift in the 
focus  of the  It transatlantic dialogue". When security concerns predominated the dialogue was led by 
the US  and European specialists in security. The end of the Cold War has meant a greater awareness 
of the importance of commercial,  environmental and social issues and created an opportunity for a 
positive EU contribution.  Security  issues  are still of major importance.  Indeed,  close cooperation 
between  the  United  States  and  the  European  Union will be  essential  if the  new  security threats 
stemming from political and economic instability and ethnic tensions are to be addressed.  But if the 
transatlantic dialogue is to be sustained in the new circumstances prevailing after the cold war, it has 
to  be  broadened  to  encompass  new  constituencies  concerned  with  commercial,  social  and 
environmental issues and the systems developed to cope with this representation. As  the EU forum 
for consultation among representatives of business, trade unions, social, environmental, consumer and 
other interests, the Economic and Social Committee therefore feels it is timely to address the question 
of the future of EU-US  relations. 
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1.2.  In a more diverse and complex "dialogue" strong economic and social interest groups, 
operating within our increasingly pluralistic societies, will campaign hard on single issues. This may, 
as  in the  1993  debates  on  trade  policy,  put pressure  on  EU-US  relations  unless  those  interests 
cooperate to recognize their common concerns and the benefits of an open approach to the rest of the 
world. 
2.  Political Framework 
2.1.  Political Developments in the USA 
2 .1.1.  During the Cold War, the US's role was to provide the security guarantee for Europe 
and other regions of the "West". In the economic sphere its leadership role had declined. But the US 
is still the world's most powerful country, and a major economic power with an increasing tendency 
to use that muscle to defend its own national interests even at the expense of multilateralism, such as 
evidenced by the growth in the use of "unilateral" trade actions. But the end of Cold War forced the 
US to redefine its role in the world in a more dramatic fashion than before. The US  is  still to decide 
on its new role. To a large extent its role will be shaped by developments, not least the policies of 
the US's major partners including the EU as well as by changing domestic politics. 
2.1.2.  The incoming President Clinton shifted the focus onto a renewal of America and on 
the  domestic  economy.  This  focus  on  renewal  found  expression  in  efforts  to  strengthen  US 
competitiveness,  through federal  support for  research and  development  and  an  aggressive  export 
strategy. Engagement in other parts of the world was run down (Somalia) or resisted (Bosnia). The 
era of President Bush saw greater commitment to the UN: attitudes have since changed, although US 
support for  European integration remains.  The  Clinton administration embraced  the concept of a 
European defence identity and a strong Common Foreign and Security Policy.  There is  a growing 
population from Latin America and the Pacific. Family and cultural ties with Europe remain strong. 
The President has shown his interest in European affairs by appointing some of the most prominent 
analysts  of Europe to the highest levels  of government.  But there has  been little contact between 
officials  responsible  for  handling  NATO  and  EU affairs.  The  administration has  championed  an 
enlargement of NATO to  include central and eastern European countries  and  sought a pragmatic 
partnership with Russia. A broad consensus in the US  insisted, however, that domestic renewal was 
a precondition for a responsible foreign policy. 
2 .1. 3.  Despite its emphasis on the domestic economy the Clinton administration supported 
the  conclusion  of the  multilateral  Uruguay  Round  trade  negotiations.  But  it also  completed  the 
ratification of the NAFTA agreement (in December 1993) and supported the target of a free trade area 
within the  APEC,  (Asia Pacific  Economic  Community),  area  by  2020  (in  September  1994)  and 
initiated a Free Trade for the Americas Agreement (in December  1994). 
2.1.4.  Recent changes following the US mid-term election of 1994, raise new doubts about 
how  the  US  will define  its  role in the world.  The new Republicans,  like the President,  were also 
elected on a largely domestic programme. Some influential members of the new Congress are seeking 
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to  reduce  US  foreign  commitments,  and  to  reduce  US  support for  multilateral  agencies  and  aid 
efforts.  Others are new to international issues, but the new speaker of the House,  Newt Gingrich, 
supported both NAFT  A and  the  Uruguay  Round.  The recent economic problems in Mexico may 
jeopardize the expansion of NAFTA.  It is  now  also  unclear whether the Clinton administration's 
agenda for post Uruguay Round trade negotiations, which included environment and social issues, will 
survive the change in Congress. Congress will have the opportunity to set up priorities and include 
or exclude some elements. For example it is now a matter of considerable debate whether Congress 
will grant fast track negotiating authority for negotiations with Latin America on the Free Trade for 
the Americas and Chile on NAFTA if they include environmental and social clauses. 
2.1.5.  In the  wake  of a new  US  resistance  to  expenditure  abroad,  this  regionalism  or 
unilateralism in trade also reflects an effort to concentrate US  areas  of political action on regions 
where there is a clear national interest. 
2.1.6.  The constituency  which feels  that during the  Cold War,  problems  at  home  were 
neglected is predominating at the moment whilst importers and exporters are failing to get across the 
benefits of an open attitude.  US  domestic policy reflects budgetary and job creation concerns.  The 
US  faces  structural problems with relatively low productivity increases  over the past twenty years 
(around  1%  annually in contrast to over 2%  in Germany and 2.5% in Japan),  growing budget and 
trade deficits  and  10-15%  of the population in poverty.  Cuts  to  the defence,  health,  housing and 
overseas  aid  budgets  are  to  be  accompanied  by  tax  cuts.  Growth  in  the  US  stands  at  2.5%, 
unemployment at 5.4%. Income and employment levels are slowing down; probably consumption will 
follow suit. A "soft landing" for the economy is expected but possibly with only a pause before more 
buoyant growth. 
Economic and Social Interest Groups 
Business 
2.1. 7.  The  two  major  representative  bodies  of  US  industry  are  the  US  Chamber  of 
Commerce and the National Association of Manufacturers. Both are represented on the US Business 
Round Table - the umbrella organization. The joint Council for EU and US  business was wound up 
due to a lack of problems to put on the agenda.  Instead a group of US  and EU businesspeople have 
twice yearly bilateral meetings  on agriculture. The National Association of US  Manufacturers  met 
with EU and Japanese industry representatives in March and hopes to establish a twice yearly pattern 
of meetings. 
2.1.8.  A joint initiative by the US  Commerce Department and the European Commission is 
to consult business on which transatlantic issues they would like to see developed.  A questionnaire 
has been sent off to thousands of companies on both sides of the Atlantic with a view to developing 
a Transatlantic Business Dialogue.  US  industry is  not interested in anything too formal,  rather in 
setting clear  priorities and  agendas.  Issues  on which it would  like to  make  progress  are  product 
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standards, testing and certification, environmental legislation, and the EU's external trade policy, e.g. 
bananas, cars, textiles. 
2.1.9.  This is an attractive proposal. The Committee would like to be briefed regularly about 
developments, about the subjects dealt with in this context and about any problems which arise. This 
information  will  make  it possible to  coordinate  attempts  to  secure  deeper  economic  and  social 
consistency between the EU and US  and may serve as  a model for other interest groups. 
Trade Unions 
2.1.10.  The US trade unions are represented by AFL-CIO which has  14 million members in 
around 80 affiliated unions. Among its achievements,  it numbers the 8 hour day and universal, free 
education.  Historically, US  labour unions were illegal, gaining legal status only in the  1930's. But 
they do  have the right to propose trade measures to government.  AFL-CIO is  non party political, 
although it runs a committee on political education. AFL-CIO has called for a Transatlantic free trade 
agreement, since the working populations have similar wage, health and safety etc. standards. Indeed 
US trade unions feel that an improved awareness in the US of EU social standards and a convergence 
of our economies would encourage better conditions in the US. Unions on either side of the Atlantic 
are  keen  to  compare  economic  models  - exploring the  reality  of the  US  "job  creating machine" 
compared with the EU "social market".  (See 3.2.3 to 3.2.7). 
Consumer Organizations and Other Citizen Groups 
2.1.11.  Consumer organizations  hold an influential position in the  US.  The largest is  the 
magazine  publisher  and  product-testing  organization,  Consumers'  Union  (CU).  CU  belongs  to 
Consumers'  International (CI),  which is  active  in campaigning  on the world trade scene  for  less 
protectionism and more safeguards for the poorest.  CU is  supported in its trade work by the small 
but focused Consumers for World Trade organization. On the other side of the fence is Ralph Nader 
and his consumer organization, which leans towards the trade unions and is critical of environmental 
dumping, for example. 
2.U:12.  The current priorities of CU  and of CI  on trade are to encourage a more open and 
responsive WTO, to promote consumer-friendly behaviour by transnational corporations, to encourage 
international competition rules and to moderate the impact of the Intellectual Property Agreement on 
pharmaceuticals  and biodiversity.  Consumer organizations in the EU also  belong to CI  and  share 
broad policy aims,  but lack significant funding for  intensive transatlantic cooperation. They would 
welcome any opportunity to deepen their discussions and to meet face-to-face. 
2.1.13.  Besides the consumer movement, there is an array of other citizens groups, charities 
and  "social" businesses on both sides of the Atlantic which would benefit from greater exchange of 
information.  For example,  interaction of citizen groups with business has taken different forms.  A 
significant route in the US has been through the promotion of social investment funds. It is estimated 
that stockholdings of over US$  600 billion in the possession of state and city authorities, pension 
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funds, mutual funds and churches are screened for social responsiveness, such as equal opportunities 
and environmental protection, by social investment funds.  The labour movement too, has  involved 
itself in standard setting for pension funds.  The result has  been significant policy change in some 
major corporations, for example, one of  the world's largest retailers decided not to buy from factories 
using  child  labour.  EU  NGOs,  on  the  other  hand,  have  used  labelling  schemes  to  encourage 
consumers to select products that have been socially or environmentally screened. · 
Farmers' Organizations 
2.1.14.  The  European  farmers  meet  regularly  through  COPA  with  the  US  Chamber  of 
Commerce, which includes the Farm Bureau. There is a split over trade issues between the two main 
US  farming  organizations.  The larger,  more powerful Farm Bureau,  which represents the bigger 
farms - about three million farmers in all, spread over most constituencies - as well as agri-business 
supported the GATT settlement, but now insists on full use of export refunds to compete with the EU. 
The National Farmers' Union opposed the GATT settlement and favours support for family farms. 
It has a membership of291,000 families, offices in 19 states and is engaged in education, cooperation 
and legislation. Farmers have objected to the recent US  cut in food  aid commitments.  (The EU and 
US  were committed during the GATT Round to providing food and other forms  of aid to ease the 
transition for poor net-food importers). 
The producer subsidy equivalent (PSE) to agriculture is higher in the EU than in the 
US. It is, however, higher per farm in the US than in the EU. 
2.2.  Political Developments in the EU 
2.2.1.  Europe is also seeking to define its role in the world. With Maastricht only a year old, 
the EU is  still developing its  ability to  speak with  one voice  in foreign  and  security policy.  For 
example,  lack of agreement within the  EU as  well  as  with the  US  is  holding up progress  on the 
Inhumane Weapons Conference due in September 1995. The demand for  "Europe to do more" both 
for its own security and for global security has increased and easily exceeded the capabilities of the 
intergovernmental pillar of Common Foreign and Security Policy built in Maastricht. In 1991  efforts 
to create a CFSP and European Defence Identity (EDI) were seen by the US  and some in Europe as 
a possible threat to the established structures of transatlantic cooperation. Today, it is  arguably the 
absence  of a strong European voice which is  undermining the American willingness to expand the 
transatlantic relationship although it should be borne in mind that the US  government is  sometimes 
held  back too  by  the  competence  of the  individual States  in areas  such  as  labour  rights  and  the 
environment. 
2.2.2.  The need  for  cohesion in external policy of the  EU  applies  equally to  the area of 
commercial policy. During the Uruguay Round of multilateral trade negotiations as well as  in other 
commercial relations the EU sometimes struggled to maintain a coherent position.  Notwithstanding 
the European Court of Justice ruling of November  1994 on EC competence  in commercial policy, 
there remains uncertainty about some areas of commercial policy. For the EU to be an effective actor 
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in transatlantic relations,  it must maintain credibility in the core area  of commercial  policy.  The 
challenges facing the EU are therefore not only in developing a common foreign and security policy 
but in maintaining a coherent common commercial policy and  in ensuring that commercial policy 
supports wider foreign/security policy objectives. 
2.2.3.  Within Europe the end of the Cold War has resulted in an increase in the importance 
of commercial  relations  for  security  and  foreign  policy.  For  example,  strengthening  economic 
relations with the neighbouring countries in central and eastern Europe and the Mediterranean is an 
important way  to  help  promote  economic  and political stability  in these  countries.  But  the  same 
developments have taken place at a global level. In the multipolar world that is evolving post Cold 
War, neither the United States, nor Europe, nor any other single power can hope to deal, successfully 
with the challenge by itself. 
2.3.  Political cooperation 
2. 3. 1.  By the 1970s the EU was confident enough to develop an external dimension to its 
cooperation. At first, the EU was keen to demonstrate its independence from the US  and the US was 
somewhat wary. But the new challenges posed by the end of the Cold War required effective political 
cooperation between the US and EU. This need was reflected in the Transatlantic declaration, adopted 
in 1990. It sets out a framework for consultation which has developed as follows: 
Normally, the President of the US, the President of the Council of Ministers and the 
President of the Commission meet biannually. The Foreign Ministers meet biannually, and twice a 
year there are sub-cabinet meetings. There is also an average of 30 meetings a year between deputy 
or  assistant Secretaries  of State  and  the  EU Troika.  These  can now  be  supplemented  by video-
teleconferencing. 
2. 3. 2.  The existence of such machinery does not, of course, guarantee effective coordination 
and during the first period of  the Clinton administration contacts were routine without always resulting 
in much genuine cooperation.  In an effort to reinvigorate the EU-US  dialogue the Berlin Heads of 
State level meeting agreed to the establishment of three ad hoc senior level working groups, chaired 
by Deputy Assistant Secretary or equivalent, so there is now continuity between biannual summits. 
There is some feeling in the US that these groups are still bedevilled by the problem 
of a disunified EU approach.  The working groups cover: 
Central and Eastern Europe- how jointly EU and US  can improve their economies, market 
access,  integration into the OECD and WTO. This is  the first joint enterprise reaching out 
to  Central  and  Eastern  Europe  and  includes  cooperation over  aid  and  on  environmental 
problems, e.g. nuclear power stations; 
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Narcotics  - operational  cooperation.  Data-intelligence  sharing,  dealing  with  international 
cartels especially; (here, the US would like to be able to deal with joint representatives of all 
the fifteen national police forces);  and 
Common Foreign and Security Policy- discussions on human rights, conflict prevention and 
on the problems of Africa come under this working group. 
From the US  side, the frustration with the lack of a united European voice on these 
issues raises questions as to whether bilateral negotiation would be more fruitful. There may therefore 
be suggestion to change the areas of work covered.  Cooperation to reduce pollution and protect the 
environment is  an area which might develop.  There are annual technical consultations between the 
US  and DG XI covering for example,  air quality, hazardous waste and climate change. 
2.3.4.  The question of a Transatlantic Treaty to deal with international policy and security 
issues is under debate. The US  is  awaiting the outcome of the inter-governmental conference before 
taking this idea up. The US would certainly welcome a process of parallel consultation alongside the 
EU'  s intergovernmental conference. The June Summit of the three presidents charged a small group 
of high level representatives to examine how to reinforce EU-US relations and to report to the next 
summit in Madrid. 
2.3.5.  If the  US  and the  EU share a responsibility for cooperation and leadership in the 
world,  they  also  share the  responsibility not to dominate.  There is  a need  to  negotiate with other 
countries  in  a genuine effort to  understand their yulture;  also  to  take  account of the problems  of 
poorer states which often lack the resources to represent their own needs on the world stage. The US 
and EU should aim to promote multilateralism wherever possible, and to involve Japan and the new 
emerging economic powers in this process. Japan is currently trying to find its international role and 
will need help in doing so. 
2. 4.  Security 
2.4.1.  Security issues are discussed within the working groups set up at the Berlin Summit. 
Following the end of the Cold War, the potential consequences of possible future conflicts are less 
all-encompassing than any direct East-West confrontation, but there have been smaller, more complex 
conflicts causing concern.  Armed conflicts in the former Yugoslavia and the former Soviet Union, 
among others, have required changes in security policies and concepts,  as well as  rapid adjustment 
to events on the ground. The process of adaptation has  begun among specialists in security policy, 
as  evidenced by the NATO Summit in January  1994 which made  progress towards establishing a 
common approach to the post-Cold War security order in Europe and appeared to set-aside some EU-
US ditierences. There have also been a number of national attempts to reformulate defence priorities, 
but the process is  far from comprehensive or complete. 
2.4.2.  The current US  administration regards the US  as an essential element of the balance 
in Europe so believes that it must be engaged.  Its priorities are to strengthen and extend NATO, to 
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support European union, to encourage the upgrading and strengthening of the OSCE, (Organization 
for cooperation and security in Europe), and to develop its new relationship with Russia. 
2.4.3.  A new element in security is the recognition of its broader definition to include the 
economic field.  Because the EU has become a major world player in economics, it is  also a serious 
contributor to world security strategy.  Examples  of economic policies which contribute to stability 
are the ACP agreement, the Russia agreements, the Europe agreements, the European energy charter 
and aid to the Middle East and the newly independent states of the Soviet Union. 
2.4.4.  One area in which the EU and US  will have to provide joint leadership within the 
framework of the UN, because of the close interaction between economic and security concerns, is 
conflict prevention.  The Committee takes  an interest in the area of conflict prevention through its 
efforts to bring together interest groups across ethnic divides in areas of potential conflict such as the 
Mediterranean and the ACP and by encouraging the growth of civil society in such regions. A current 
US  bill aims to cut the US  contribution to the UN peacekeeping effort; though it may be vetoed by 
the President. A reduced US  commitment to peacekeeping is a matter for concern, but money could 
be saved by earlier action. A willingness to allocate resources to conflict prevention and to effective 
early warning systems of potential flash points would save the international community money as well 
as  saving lives. 
2.4.5.  For example,  a more common interpretation of the broad criteria for  arms  exports 
which were agreed by the permanent members of the Security Council, in the European Union and 
by the members of the OSCE may promote responsibility and restraint in arms transfers. 
2.5.  Overseas Aid 
2.5 .1.  For over two decades, official concessional aid has stagnated at a level less than half 
the target of 0.7 percent of the GNP. 
Very  few  EU  countries  have  reached  the  target  and,  for  the  United  States,  the 
percentage amounts to hardly a quarter of this target of which more than half goes to two countries, 
Egypt and  Israel.  One  problem,  perhaps,  is  the  lack  of development  education to sustain public 
support for  overseas  aid.  Furthermore,  there  are  threats  from  the  new  Congress  to  subsume the 
Agency  for  International  Development  under  the  State  Department  and  to  reduce  overseas  aid, 
especially to Africa. The Committee has frequently expressed its concern about the increasing poverty 
in, and isolation of, Africa. It is alarmed by this Congress proposal and indeed believes that the extent 
of poverty in developing countries and  its destabilizing effect is  sufficiently pressing that the EU, 
Japan and the US  should discuss cooperation on a major new aid programme. 
2. 6.  The Environment 
The Committee has commented before on the need for the industrialized countries to 
be the first to take action,  because of their responsibility for much of global pollution and because 
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they have the resources to act1. Each individual in the industrial world consumes  15 times as much 
of the world's resources  as  one in the developing world.  Yet at the most recent EU-US Summit , 
there was no mention of cooperation on environmental issues and progress at the Berlin conference 
on the climate change convention was disappointing. Progress at UNCED was also disappointing. The 
United States has a vigorous environmental movement. The EU and US should cooperate as a matter 
of urgency. 
2. 7.  Educational and Other Exchanges 
2. 7 .1.  The European Union's Visitors' Programme (EUVP) arranges for 24 opinion-leaders 
from throughout the US to visit the EU annually. They come from trade unions, academia, the media 
and  occasionally,  voluntary  organizations.  There are  also  bilateral exchanges.  Similarly,  the  US 
Information Agency (USIA) sponsors young leaders form government and other non-profit sectors 
to visit the US, both from the EU and bilaterally. NATO has exchange programmes for academics. 
2.7.2.  Further, vast numbers of universities send thousands of students both ways across the 
Atlantic by arrangements between individual universities. An example of bilateral exchange is that 
between the  US  and  French military schools;  also  student exchanges  between leadership  training 
institutions in the US  and France (especially the Ecole Nationale d'  Administration). 
2.7.3.  Exchanges are frequent therefore but not as systematic as they might be; there is no 
central clearing house to put visitors in touch with appropriate sponsors and vice versa.  Particular 
gaps felt are exchange programmes for faculty members  to lecture at each others' universities and 
participate in conferences and think tanks, for which there should be non-government funding,  and 
exchanges for voluntary organizations. 
2.7.4.  The Commission has a mandate to negotiate a cooperation agreement with Canada and 
the US  on higher education and vocational training.  This would involve more intensive interaction 
between EU, US  and Canadian higher education establishments, training organizations and business 
interests.  Support has  been given to  23  cooperation projects,  bringing together some  200 higher 
education  establishments  on,  for  example,  the  environment  and  microbiology  and  international 
marketing for small and medium-sized businesses. The focus is on student and staff mobility, common 
study programmes and course unit transfer schemes. 
3.  The Centrality of Economic Relations 
The  end  of the  cold  war  has  increased  the  importance  of commercial  relations 
compared with military power, for example,  through the promotion of economic and thus political 
stability. Trade, economic and environmental agreements whether multilateral (worldwide), as in the 
WTO (World Trade Organization set up  by the latest GATT round) and  UNCED (United Nations 
See Committee's Opinion on the proposal for a resolution of the Council of the European Communities on a Community 
programme of  policy and action in relation to the environment and sustainable development (Rapporteur Mr. BOISSEREE) 
Official Journal C 287 of 4 April 1992. 
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Conference on Environment and Development), or regional, as in NAFT  A, or the FT  AA (Free Trade 
Agreement for the Americas) now play a greater role in international relations. 
3  .1.  Transatlantic Economic Relations 
3 .1.1.  Recent instability in exchange rates, brought about by the decline in the value of the 
dollar, have reawoken European concern about apparant US disinterest in the impact of exchange rate 
changes  on the  rest of the  world.  There  is  a deep-seated  preference for  stable exchange  rates  in 
Europe born out of many years exposure to currency fluctuations.  Given the size of the US economy 
in relation to the world economy and the extent of its trade within NAFT  A,  the US  has been less 
affected and has taken a more nonchalant attitude to international exchange rate stability. 
3  .1.2.  The tradition of  saving is higher in the EU than in the US. Lack of  savings contributes 
to the constant inflow of capital into the US seen in recent years and lower confidence in the dollar. 
The dollar may  in fact be losing its position as the single dominant currency with the D-mark (and 
then eventually the single European currency) and the yen playing more important roles. 
3.1.3.  One efficient way to counteract the fall  in the dollar would be to increase interest 
rates,  but this will not be done for  international purposes only for domestic ones.  There is  limited 
concern in the  US  that the  low  value  of the  dollar may  trigger inflation by  raising  the price  of 
imports.  The perception is  that this  is  outweighed  by  the  benefits  to  exporters.  US  industry,  in 
particular,  is  happy  with the low dollar value and with the government policy  of benign neglect. 
Meanwhile EU exporters are losing out to US  competitors. 
3.1.4.  This problem underlines the lack of international cooperation on macroeconomic and 
monetary issues.  Industry on both sides of the Atlantic agree that instability and swings in currency 
values on the world market are unhelpful. EU policy puts the battle against inflation and stability of 
its currencies first. 
3 .1.5.  Beyond  exchange  rates  transatlantic  relations  are  reasonably  sound.  Improved 
economic growth in Europe has reduced divergencies in growth rates between the EU and US.  But 
even here there are underlying differences, with continental Europe showing a greater price stability 
than the US, where shorter term economic growth prospects are relatively more important. 
3.1.6.  The conclusion of the  Uruguay  Round has  removed  a substantial irritant in trade 
relations. There are no structural trade deficits across the Atlantic and trade balances change over time 
but broadly reflect relative growth and exchange rate changes.  For example,  the EU's trade deficit 
with the US fell from ECU 10.8 bn in 1992 to ECU 2.2 bn in 1993  as  a result of European export 
growth  to  match  high  GDP  growth  in  the  US.  This  was  mainly  reflected  in  a  growth  in EU 
manufactured  products,  for  which  a US  trade  surplus  with the  EU  of US$  5.1  bn in  1992  was 
converted into a deficit with the EU in manufactures of US$ 2.2 bn in 1993 (Eurostat). 
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3.1.7.  EU-US  trade  is  very  important.  Two-way trade  in  1994  will be  of the  order of 
US$  170 billion. But it is in the increase in foreign direct investment across the Atlantic that one sees 
the degree of economic interdependence.  US  foreign direct investment in Europe totals around US$ 
250 billion (some 41% of total US FDI) and EU FDI in the US about the same amount (or more than 
50%  of European FDI).  (See tables 9,  10  and  11  for  details).  This compares  with US$ 48  billion 
investment in Asia.  The sales  of European affiliates  of US  companies  total  US$  800 billion per 
annum, and the sales of the US  affiliates of European companies US$ 600 billion. 2.8m Europeans 
are employed in US companies and 2.7m US citizens in EU companies. There is thus a broad balance 
of trade between the two, unlike the structural trade deficit which the US has with Japan and China. 
3. 2.  Differences in Approach to Domestic Market Regulation 
3.2.1.  Despite this sound basis, transatlantic economic relations are repeatedly disrupted by 
disputes  of varying degrees  of intensity  over  what  often  appear  to  be  issues  of relatively minor 
importance to the economies as  a whole, for example bovine somatotropin and hormones in beef. In 
order to understand why such disputes arise,  it is  necessary to understand the different approaches 
to domestic, regulatory policies and trade or commercial policies that persist between the EU and US. 
3.2.2.  There are three areas of difference between the EU and US: 
the nature of the market economy in each; 
the approaches to regulation of market distortions; and 
how the US  and EU deal with the regulation of interdependent and integrating economies. 
The nature of the market economy 
3.2.3.  The tirst of these concerns the predominant social market, consensus-based, market 
economy in the EU as  compared to the free  market,  Anglo-Saxon form of market economy in the 
United States. In the former, higher social provision is seen as  a means of achieving broad consensus 
among the social partners, which in turn promotes productivity and competitiveness. There is also a 
greater emphasis  on institutions to ensure social cohesion and the fulfilment of regional and  other 
structural policy objectives.  The operation of the market is  shaped by the existence of a regulatory 
framework based on a broad consensus within society. This fundamental difference finds expression 
in many ways including, for example, labour market regulation. In its Opinion of 20 October 1993, 
the Committee stressed that the most pressing problem facing the EU Member States at present is how 
to return to a growth rate high enough to mop up unemployment, while also maintaining an effective 
system of social protection and solidarity which reflects the aspirations and traditions of EU citizens. 
Here the Committee  was  reflecting the  European preference for  achieving  a consensus  and  social 
cohesion. 
3.2.4.  Broadly speaking, the EU emphasis is  on maintaining standards and wage levels for 
those in work and on shoring up declining industries, perhaps at the expense of creating new jobs for 
the unemployed. The US approach is the opposite. There is very little protection for workers who are 
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fired for trying to set up unions. It may take years for the legal system to reinstate them in their jobs. 
Employers can also permanently replace strikers with new workers. As a result, although, according 
to an independent survey commissioned by AFL-CIO, 40%  of the workforce say they would like to 
join a union, only 16% belong. The US has approximately six per cent unemployment compared with 
an average 10.9% per cent in the EU. Since President Clinton took office 6. 3 million jobs have been 
created. However, 20% of these have been low paid jobs in discount shopping stores while well-paid 
blue collar jobs in tyres, steel and cars have failed to return to  1990 pre recession levels. In recent 
years, the gap between blue collar and white collar workers has widened and with the exception of 
some such as  auto workers, blue collar real wages have decreased. 
3.2.5.  Unemployment benefits  depend upon the laws  of the  different Federal States.  On 
average about 30% of the unemployed are covered. The remainder rely on welfare and food stamps. 
There is no state health insurance system. Only the very poor and retired people receive free medical 
care. Perhaps  15-20% of people draw the minimum wage with 10-15%  of the population below the 
poverty level. 
3.2.6.  In the US, social provision is often seen first and foremost as a cost, which reduces 
competitiveness and thus the ability to pay for social provision. There is no broad political consensus 
on the regulatory framework within which markets are to operate. As a result there is a tendency for 
changes  and  arguably  a tendency for  regulatory  competition and  legal  actions  to  shape the  legal 
framework rather than for political preferences to do so.  In this area there is, in effect, competition 
between the more laissez-faire Anglo-American form of  market economy and the continental European 
model,  across the Atlantic as well as within the EU. 
3.2.7.  A  perhaps  otherwise  harsh  environment  is  tempered  by  the  USA's  tradition  of 
voluntary help. However, the very many voluntary organizations tend to lack mass membership or 
resources. They may on occasion, for example, rely on union help. 
Regulation of market failure 
3.2.8.  The United States has been developing regulatory policies within the federation of 
states for  nearly 200 years.  This was  based on limited regulatory intervention in cases  of market 
failure.  Within Europe, regulation of market failure was  carried out at the national level until the 
1980s when establishment of a genuine single European market following the earlier development of 
the common market necessitated the removal of national regulatory barriers. The national approach 
within Europe used,  more  often than in the  United States, to be to take the sector concerned into 
public ownership (i.e. utilities). This resulted in regulatory policies under more political control than 
the  independent regulatory  agencies  that developed  in the  United States  under the control of the 
Federal and State Courts. The 1980s has seen a shift in Europe towards more regulatory agencies, 
but there is  still reluctance to  accept the establishment of agencies without direct political control, 
especially at the European level. As  a result more areas of regulatory policy are subject to political 
discretionary control in Europe than in the  US.  Moves  to  create  a single market in Europe have 
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reduced the  discretion in the hands  of national regulatory authorities,  so that there has  been some 
convergence between the US  and European practice. 
Regulation of interdependent and integrating markets 
3.2.9.  Although the US may have a long history and experience in the regulation of market 
failure, it is the EU which has developed the most advanced techniques and methods for dealing with 
regulation  in  integrating  markets.  The  EU  approach  is  based  on  policy  approximation,  mutual 
recognition and home state regulatory jurisdiction. The United States approach continues to be shaped 
by traditional  "trade"  policies and thus  national treatment and  host state control.  These respective 
approaches are being reflected in the regional approaches of the EU and the US  . 
3. 3.  US and EU external commercial policies compared 
There are  also  differences  in EU  and  US  approaches  to  commercial policy which 
result  from  the  structures  of  decision-making  concerning  commercial  policy  and  historical 
developn1ents. 
The United States 
3. 3 .1.  The US  has proved much more proactive than the EU in commercial diplomacy.  In 
the  last decade  the  US  has  pushed for  a new  round of the  GATT  (the  Uruguay  Round),  but US 
support for multilateral approaches  to trade and investment issues  has  become  progressively more 
qualified  since the  early  1970s.  Support for  multilateral negotiations  has  been  accompanied  by  a 
strengthening of domestic trade remedies  with which to  address what the US  perceives as  "unfair" 
trade  practices  and  policies  not  adequately  addressed  by  multilateral  negotiations.  These  trade 
remedies have taken the form of enhanced countervailing and anti-dumping provisions as well as the 
"unilateral" instrument Section 301. The qualified support for multilateral solutions was also reflected 
in the US position during the Uruguay Round on the area of dispute settlement and the establishment 
of the WTO and cases such as  services.  The issue of sovereignty sets clear limits to how far the US 
can  or  is  willing  to  go  towards  multilateral  agreements  which touch upon  constitutional powers 
granted to  Congress  in  commercial  policy and  to  the  individual states  in  areas  of regulatory  and 
investment policy. 
3.3 .2.  Whilst the  US  has  been  able  to  initiate  multilateral  negotiations,  it  has  become 
progressively less  able to determine the shape of the multilateral rules as  other players, notably the 
EU, have gained in relative economic weight. At least in partial response to this loss of influence at 
the multilateral level the  US  has  also initiated or supported regional agreements with Canada (US-
Canada Free Trade Agreement of 1989), Mexico (North American Free Trade Agreement of 1994). 
More recently the  US  has  become more active in regional strategies and initiated negotiations with 
the  rest of the western hemisphere which the  aim  of establishing  a Free Trade for  the  Americas 
Agreement  (FTAA)  (in  December  1994)  and  has  supported  the  calls  for  a  similar  free  trade 
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arrangement covering the Pacific Rim countries in APEC (in September 1994). These developments 
suggest that regional agreements may be one of the US  priorities over the coming years. 
3.3.3.  In  addition to  the  multilateral  and  regional  pillars  of US  policy  there  is  also  a 
plurilateral pillar. This takes the form of qualified mfn (most favoured nation agreements),  such as 
the Government Purchasing Agreement in the GATT or agreements of "like-minded countries" such 
as the current effort to establish a binding investment instrument in the OECD. 
3.3.4.  Finally and worryingly, the US  has become progressively more active in unilateral 
policy as the feeling that the multilateral system only serves others and not the United States' interests 
has grown. The EU should seek to bring the US back fully to the multilateral approach.  The active 
use of "unfair" trade provisions designed to provide remedies for US  interests affected by what are 
perceived to be the unfair practices of other countries has assumed greater importance.  These take 
the form of Section 301 (introduced in the 1973 Trade Act), Super 301 (introduced in 1988 and since 
1994 based on an executive order) and Special 301  for instances in which the US believe its trading 
partners are not protecting US  intellectual property rights sufficiently. Nor are anti-dumping actions 
in any way limited to the protection from predatory pricing envisaged under the WTO. In short the 
United States uses one of three pillars, or a combination of multilateral, plurilateral, regional and 
unilateral instruments, depending on which can best achieve US  objectives. 
The European Union 
3.3.5.  In contrast to this  activism on the  part of the US,  the EU has  tended to  be more 
reactive. It followed the US  (and Japan) into the Uruguay Round with an agenda largely set by US 
proactive pressure. Once in the Round, the EU supported the process of negotiations and continuously 
pressed  for  genuine  multilateral  solutions  (when  the  US  sometimes  appeared  ready  to  accept 
plurilateral deals).  As  the  US  has  moved  to  question the benefits  of a  "rules-based"  multilateral 
system, the EU has come more and more to accept such a system, as is illustrated in the EU support 
for the WTO and revised dispute settlement provisions agreed in the Uruguay Round. 
3.3.6.  At a regional level the EU has had, if anything a greater impact, than the US.  The 
European acquis is being put forward as an aim for neighbouring countries seeking guaranteed access 
to  the large single European market.  The EU is  also now developing policies which appear to be 
aimed  at  establishing  links  with  other  regional  entities.  New  or  proposed  preferential  trading 
arrangements now cover, EU-CEE (Central and Eastern Europe), EU-Mediterranean, EU-ACP, ED-
CIS,  EU-Mexico and EU-Mercosur. 
3.3.7.  Unlike the US,  the EU has  not made  extensive use of unilateral action.  The main 
reason for this is a welcome commitment to multilateralism, as well as the absence of any consensus, 
among the Member State governments, on the advisability of deploying the "big stick" of unilateral 
leverage. The New Commercial Instrument has only been used in a few minor cases. A revised NCI 
may  change this but the Commission's proposals will only open up the scope for industry petitions 
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under the NCI. The instrument still clearly comes under multilateral discipline of the WTO. As the 
United States, however, the EU can, and does, use trade instruments such as anti-dumping measures. 
3.3.8.  The  only  substantial  trading  powers  with whom  the  EU  or  the  US  are  not  now 
discussing the possibility of a special trading arrangement  are each other (See para 8.1.8.6).  The 
question here is  whether the future lies in toning down these regional agreements,  multilateralizing 
them, or dividing the globe into competing blocs, from which the economically weak, such as many 
African nations,  may  be  excluded.  As  the  two  major  trading powers,  the  US  and  EU share the 
responsibility  to  take  proper  account  of the  politically  and  economically  weaker  nations.  The 
disadvantages to those countries excluded from regional agreements  are moderated only slightly by 
GATT rules. The WTO has slightly strengthened the right to challenge preferential trade agreements 
which do not progress into free trade areas within ten years or which do not include substantially "all 
trade",  but not sufficiently to  check their growth or  any  negative  impact  on third countries.  The 
potential  exists,  therefore  for  the  evolution  of completing  regional  approaches  to  dealing  with 
increased economic interdependence. The EU and US need therefore to make efforts to multilateralize 
their regional efforts or come to some accommodation with each other. 
4.  Bilateral Issues 
The vast majority of trade relations between the EU and the US  are trouble-free but 
there are some bilateral irritants, many of them characterized by the different approach to regulation 
as  described above. 
4. 1.  EU Enlargement 
Overall the accession of Austria, Sweden and Finland has significantly reduced import 
tariffs for the US,  notwithstanding increases  in some  areas  such as  chemicals  and computer parts. 
Finnish tariffs  on  semi-conductors have  gone up  14%  for  example.  For this the  US  is  entitled to 
compensation by GATT. Disputes over the scale of compensation featured in EU-US relations after 
the last enlargement of the EU. In the current enlargement an  interim agreement has been reached 
which  has  defused  some  of the  tension,  but there  remain  some  doubts  about  the  final  level  of 
"compensation", with the EU emphasizing the gains made by the US  in other sectors. 
The US  is also concerned that the EU should not extend barriers as it integrates more 
closely  with Central  and  Eastern Europe.  Already  there  is  some  inclination in the  CEE to  give 
preference to the EU. 
4.2.  Audio-visual 
This is perhaps the clearest example of differing EU-US perceptions of the need for 
regulation.  In this  sector some  Member  States  support the  regulation of broadcasting in  order to 
maintain a national/European cultural identity, to monitor the quality of material shown on European 
television and to support the national/European film industry. In the US,  a free market in television 
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is equated with free speech and thus any restriction as undermining democracy. The US has therefore 
objected to the EU requirement for the majority of entertainment broadcast in the EU to be of EU 
origin "where practicable". Tensions are building up on this issue which both sides see as fundamental 
although the US  industry would be alarmed if it came to sanctions. It is perhaps more concerned at 
the threat that the cultural argument, which it does not fully recognize, will be applied by the EU to 
new technologies.  The General  Agreement on Trade in Services  (GATS)  covers the audio-visual 
sector,  but  the  EU  sought  an  exemption  from  commitments  to  offer  national  treatment  which 
effectively excludes the sector from the provisions of the GATS. Bilateral tensions on this issue are 
therefore unlikely to be resolved through GATS intermediation. A transatlantic dialogue on this, with 
clearer EU definition of the boundaries of its cultural argument could help. 
4.3.  Food Standards- Bovine Somatotropin (BST)  and Hormones in Beef 
4.3.1.  There are two trade differences over food  standards of which hormones in beef is 
likely to cause earlier tension. The EU extended moratorium on BST will probably also be challenged 
by the US.  The Uruguay Round agreement says that food standards cannot be challenged as  trade 
barriers, as  long as  there is  scientific backing for them.  However in both cases there is  imperfect 
scientific evidence; and the agreement makes no provision for dealing with uncertainties. If  scientific 
opinion is  divided, however, the agreement provides for preventive measures.  The US  position at 
home is that it will maintain the highest possible food standards and allow the benefit of the doubt 
where scientific evidence is uncertain. At the same time it is pushing the EU to accept imports of beef 
produced with hormones  and  has  rejected the  call of the EU and  certain US  beef producers for 
certification of beef produced without hormones. 
4.3.2.  Consumer information on food  standards  shoul? be provided on both sides  of the 
Atlantic, but labelling would not work for BST since methods for detecting residues have not been 
developed yet and milk is  pooled which would make identification for labelling very difficult.  The 
Committee supported the EU moratorium in its Opinion on the use of Bovine Somatotropin in the 
European Union (CES  1023/94 September 1994) partly on the grounds that BST is not needed and 
in view of consumer  opposition.  Neither of these reasons  would be valid under the new  GATT. 
However,  the  Committee's  other  objections;  animal  welfare  and  effect  on  consumers  of likely 
increased antibiotic use give the EU a good case.  The fact that a limited number of countries with 
production deficits have authorized the use of the hormone should not mean that health regulations 
can be relaxed at international level. Freer trade need not mean lower standards. 
4.4.  Product Standards 
4. 4. 1.  The issues being discussed are those of transparency of product standards,  mutual 
recognition and,  going further,  mutual certification.  This would enable manufacturers  to test just 
once, in each others' markets. An example of the problems to be overcome is that the US  Food and 
Drugs Administration does not certify.  There are many  different certifying agencies which the US 
would need to clarify for  exporters.  EU environmental standards for  example  are  not completely 
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coherent either. The American Chamber of Commerce advises its members to adhere to the German 
regulations as  these are geJ;terally the tightest. 
4.4.2.  The first  step  to  complete  is  the  mutual  recognition  agreement  which  should be 
adopted  within  the  two  year  deadline.  US  manufacturers  would  like  it  extended  to  cover 
telecommunications and pharmaceuticals.  It is  not always clear to third country manufacturers how 
to obtain marks like the CE mark.  Standards cooperation on the environment would be useful both 
to reinforce enviromental protection and to forge regulatory cooperation.  There needs to be more 
cooperation on eco-labelling,  packaging and  recycling and to ensure that environmental standards 
generally are not biased to the domestic market. 
4. 5.  Agriculture 
4.5 .1.  Budgetary constraints mean that the US is likely to cut subsidies to its agriculture. For 
example, current proposals would eliminate the sugar and peanut price support programmes. The long 
term US  aim for  agricultural trade remains,  in theory,  the elimination of export subsidies.  There 
could, therefore, be growing pressure from the US for the EU to do more to reduce export and other 
subsidies to agriculture.  This could result if the US  does  reduce its national subsidy programmes. 
Under the  Uruguay Round Agreement,  there is  a commitment to  reduce  agricultural support and 
protection further in the resumed multilateral trade negotiations due to  begin in 1999.  From a US 
point a view, Community production and exports which receive some form of government assistance 
are the major source of concern and are at the core of many of the bilateral trade disputes. This may 
be eased  by  further  reform of the  CAP  in preparation for  the  accession  of Central  and  Eastern 
Europe. Given the GATT commitments,  the agricultural sectors from these countries could not be 
accommodated within an enlarged EU without first modifying the farm support arrangements. 
4.5.2.  There have been improvements  in transatlantic relations  over agriculture since the 
GATT Round was concluded.  The possibility now exists,  within the framework  of WTO rules to 
prevent unfair  competition,  that both US  and  EU farming  could become  genuinely  competitive. 
Pressure to move this way is likely to come from EU non-agricultural industries, which currently lose 
resources to agriculture and which want access to the CEE market, as well as from the more efficient 
farmers,  allowed in some sectors since the MacSharry reforms of the CAP to compete more on price 
for the right to expand. 
4.5.3.  If  the EU and US  did manage to agree to more open markets in the agricultural and 
other sectors, - this would pave the way for freer trade across the board. Whilst the potential gains 
to the EU economy would be great, there would be concomitant disadvantages for certain sectors in 
the EU and the US. 
4. 6.  Aircraft 
The  EU  and  US  came  to  an  agreement  in  1993  on  subsidies  for  aircraft 
manufacturers. This set limits on subsidies with which airbus could cope. However, the US is raising 
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the issue again as it is the subject of strong lobbying by the US aviation industry. For its part, the EU 
has reservations about indirect subsidies to the US  industry. 
4. 7.  Telecommunications and Information Policy 
4. 7 .1.  The  EU  and  US  have  not  yet  reached  agreement  on  the  opening  of  the 
telecommunications  procurement  markets.  There  is  also  increasing  US  pressure  on  the  EU  to 
liberalize its network provision faster than the agreed timetable.  Given the developments in the US 
with the construction of "information highways", there could be scope for trade conflicts over access 
to  each  others  information markets.  Bilateral  consultations  are  taking  place  on the  "information 
society"  and there was a successful major conference at the end of February in Brussels to discuss 
the issue.  This was agreed as  the European contribution to a widening of G7  talks  on future issues 
and follows the Detroit discussion on labour market regulation in March 1994. 
4.7.2.  In  principle there  is  considerable  scope  for  gain  from  increased  competition  in 
financial services and telecommunications. However, there are also risks that systems of prudential 
control and investor and policy holder protection will not be up to the task of protecting consumers. 
There are also risks that increased competition could jeopardize services to some groups of  consumers 
such as those living in sparsely populated areas. Careful monitoring of  the agreements will be needed. 
5.  Issues concerning the EU and US roles in the Multilateral System 
5 .1.  Implementation of the Uruguay Round Results 
5  .1.1.  Congress has now ratified the Uruguay Round and the Council of Ministers did so 
on 19/20 December 1994. But in both cases implementing legislation contained a number of  measures 
that could  create difficulties for  US-EU relations  and  influence the results.  For example,  the  US 
Congress has tended to use ambiguity in the text of the Uruguay Round agreement to defend US trade 
remedies.  Although the establishment of a Commission on WTO Dispute Settlement was  seen as 
having  more  political  relevance  than  substance,  if the  US  is  successfully  challenged  on  its 
implementation of the Uruguay Round agreements the Commission could be called into action. This 
could raise the question of US  commitment to the WTO. In Europe, the European Commission has 
included a strengthening of  the New Commercial Instrument (opening the way for industries to initiate 
investigations). This is modelled on the US Section 301  and could be seen as a worrying shift towards 
a more unilateral approach and away from multilateral dispute settlement. 
5.2.  The operation of the World Trade Organization 
5.2.1.  The WTO could also figure in the medium-term issues in EU-US relations.  One of 
the major successes of the Uruguay Round was the decision to create a new body with legal status, 
the world trade organization, to oversee the conduct of trade relations between its members.  It will 
administer all existing GATT agreements, including the results of the Uruguay Round, the integrated 
dispute settlement mechanism,  and the trade policy review mechanism.  The organization will also 
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provide  a forum  for  further  trade  negotiations.  All parties  to  the  GATT  are  eligible to  become 
members. 
5.2.2.  The  multilateral trade  organization will be  administered  by  a  general  council  of 
representatives of all members. The general council will also establish separate councils, to oversee 
the operations of specific agreements. There will be a ministerial conference at least once every two 
years. 
5.2.3.  If  it is sufficiently resourced to oversee increased access to information, a broadening 
of GATT consultation procedures and wider analysis of the impact of trade measures to incorporate 
developmental, environmental and social issues, this would be a positive development. The WTO will 
not be accountable to the UN General Assembly. 
5.2.4.  The  new  order's  bias  towards  commerce  contrasts  with  the  broader  sddal and 
developmental perspective that was behind the concept of the International Trade Organization (ITO) 
proposed at the UN conference on Trade and Employment in 1947. A more powerful WTO could be 
advantageous to economically weaker participants, but their interests (and those of social, consumer 
and environmental interests) require special attention. 
5.2.5.  The Uruguay Round agreement has succeeded in strengthening the multilateral dispute 
settlement procedures of the WTO. For example, under the new procedures it is no longer possible 
for one Contracting Party to block a Panel Decision. Only unanimity of all Contracting Parties can 
block decisions of the WTO panels. If  this more adjudicative approach to trade disputes works it will 
facilitate  the  evolution of a WTO  "case  law",  thus  enabling  the  WTO  rules  to  evolve  with the 
international economy and political preferences of the WTO Contracting Parties. Such a development 
would, however, mean a progressive increase in the  "supranational" elements of the WTO. 
5.2.6.  The EU has  traditionally opposed  adjudication in the resolution of trade disputes, 
arguing that commercial policy issues affect national policy preferences and cannot therefore be left 
to an unaccountable, quasi-legal system of decision making. The US has traditionally favoured more 
adjudication in order to ensure that decisions were taken.  Paradoxically the positions now appear to 
have  reversed,  with the  EU  supporting  multilateral  adjudication  (as  a  means  of controlling  the 
unilateral interpretation of  multilateral rules by the US) and the US (or at least parts of Congress) now 
getting nervous about the potential loss of sovereignty involved. Another important factor here is the 
awareness  of environmental  and  other  interest  groups  that  decisions  taken  in  Geneva  will  have 
important implications on national policy options. For the WTO to work effectively both the US  and 
the EU must support the new procedures. It is  not yet clear that there is  a firm commitment to the 
more adjudicative approach. 
5 .2. 7.  If the WTO is not seen as  being credible in the resolution of trade disputes there is 
a danger that the US, possibly followed by the EU, will revert to unilateral means of enforcing trade 
agreements.  As  this means,  in effect,  a unilateral interpretation of what is  "fair", the multilateral 
system would be undermined and much of what was agreed during the Uruguay Round would be not 
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worth much more than the paper on which it was written. The Committee would therefore like to see 
EU-US cooperation on the development of the WTO to ensure its effective operation. The US is also 
calling for much more transparency within the WTO. 
5.2.8.  The EU has expressed concern about the focus on the bilateral and unilateral approach 
in US trade policy. One example is the attempt of the US, in the light of its serious trade deficit with 
Japan, to open up the Japanese market on the basis of quantitative targets. The US-Japan agreements 
were  negotiated  on the  basis  of most  favoured  national  treatment,  which  should  mean  that  the 
liberalization is of  benefit to others. The question is whether the agenda will properly encompass other 
interests and how the EU could contribute to discussions. 
5.2.9.  Another problem is the panoply of unilateral trade measures still provided for under 
Section 301, Special 301 and Super 301. This under  lines the importance of the new dispute settlement 
procedures agreed in the Uruguay Round and the need to challenge implementation of 301  measures. 
Both parties need to renew their commitment to multilateralism. 
Services 
5.2.10.  The general agreement on trade in services seeks to apply general GATT rules and 
disciplines, such as  non-discrimination, transparency and dispute settlement to all services with the 
exception of services supplied as  part of governmental functions.  The agreement contains annexes 
which take into account the different nature of various sectors.  Specific commitments  to  liberalize 
individual  sectors  such  as  transport,  financial  services  (for  which  some  safeguards  to  protect 
consumers apply) and telecommunications are to be undertaken through bilateral negotiation which 
leaves scope for US-EU cooperation. The US has concluded a financial services agreement with Japan 
and  is  committed to. work for the  next  18  months  for  its  incorporation under the WTO.  Serious 
negotiations under GATT are only just beginning. Offers are required by the end of June. The EU, 
which has a fairly open policy on services has put in its bid. The US  offer is  still awaited. 
5 .2.11.  As is the case with trade in goods, general exemptions will be available for specific 
purposes  such as  protecting the  health and safety  of plants,  animals  and  humans,  and  preventing 
deception and fraud.  However, the agreement also allows signatories to request exemptions from the 
principle of non-discrimination for particular measures. These exemptions are then subject to review 
after five years and a normal limit of ten years.  Service industries which are not exempted by their 
governments may be the subject of retaliation if foreign service companies are discriminated against. 
If services are eventually incorporated into GATT in a super trade regime, then the violating country 
could face cross retaliation actions. This means that the country offended can retaliate not only in the 
area of services but in goods as well. 
6.  New Issues in Commercial Policy 
The Uruguay Round dealt with the issues of the 1980s. Issues being discussed in the 
1990s  include trade  and  investment,  trade and  environment,  trade and  competition and  trade  and 
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social issues.  There is  a risk that the US  and EU will adopt divergent approaches, or alternatively, 
will fail to take full account of the impact on developing countries. 
6 .1.  Trade and Investment 
6. 1.1.  Efforts  to  develop  a  new  international  investment  instrument  will  be  of central 
importance  in the coming  months  and  years.  The  US  appears  at  present to favour  a plurilateral 
approach to investment, such as through a binding Multilateral agreement on an Investment Instrument 
in the OECD.  The EU is  in the process of determining its policy in this area.  The issue includes 
whether  a plurilateral approach in the  OECD  should be pursued initially,  or whether  a genuine 
multilateral agreement should be sought from the outset.  As  it is  the developing economies which 
would be potentially most affected by a new investment regime, the tactics of how to negotiate are 
important. To produce an agreement in the OECD and try to impose it on the developing economies 
may  not be most politic approach.  On the  other hand,  developing economies  are  keen to  attract 
investment and the case is  made,  primarily in the United States, that once an OECD instrument is 
available countries will have no option but to sign up to it. 
6.1.2.  The  Commission proposal on  investment,  not yet fully  endorsed by the  Council, 
requests the OECD to pursue its work aimed at elaborating a multilateral investment agreement and 
urges an early start of discussions in the WTO in order to prepare formal negotiations which should 
begin as soon as possible. 
6. 2.  Trade and the Environment 
6.2.1.  Important negotiations on trade and the environment are taking place,. in the WTO 
and OECD, with concerns being expressed about the impact of increasing trade on the environment. 
Here US  and EU positions will again be important for the shape of any future agreements.  To date 
the  US  has  appeared  more  willing  to  adopt  unilateral  trade  measures  in  pursuit  of  its  own 
environmental policy objectives than the EU. For example, the US  imposed standards regarding the 
drowning of dolphins while catching tuna on tuna imports, which were based on the quantity drowned 
in US catches. The US negotiated an environmental clause to the NAFT  A agreement, with which the 
environmental organizations were dissatisfied as lacking muscle. Even so, its future is in doubt with 
the new Congress. 
6.2.2.  The  threat  of green  protectionism  (often  envisaged  for  use  against  the  poorer 
countries) would be greatly reduced if the EU and  US  took a lead in international environmental 
agreements  and in reducing their own contribution to pollution.  Whilst the  Committee  shares the 
concerns of environmental organizations about the extent of current environmental destruction, there 
are risks in shifting the global environmental debate too firmly into the trade arena where developing 
countries are so vulnerable to protectionism.  Many  of the solutions to trade-related environmental 
destruction  lie  outside  the  competence  of the  WTO.  Protectionism  is  not  the  way  to  enforce 
environmental (or social) improvements on to other countries- especially developing countries. The 
use of import taxes to penalise "environmental dumping", for example, relies on each nation acting 
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as judge and jury. Further, different environmental standards are sometimes acceptable in different 
countries  and  environmental import duties,  for  example,  are  likely to be  counter-productive.  The 
result  may  well  be  to  relocate  the  polluting  industry  into  the  country  imposing  environmental 
protection  and  to  leave  the  poorer  exporting  nation to  try  to  undercut  the  protection  or  to  sell 
elsewhere by lowering its prices and standards. 
6.2.3.  Nonetheless environmental damage is  of immense concern. The EU and US  should 
encourage stringent international agreements and their consumers to modify their lifestyles. (This is 
an area where EU-US ngos should cooperate.) There are ways in which GATT should be made more 
supportive of environmental objectives. 
This is  an area of work where the Committee might usefully contribute an opinion. 
6.3.  Competition Policy 
6.3.1.  Despite legal problems with the  status  of the  1991  bilateral anti-trust agreement, 
cooperation and regulatory coordination in this field between the competition authorities of the US 
and the EU has begun. Information is exchanged between the competition authorities, which can help 
address the effects  of anti-competitive behaviour outside the jurisdiction of either party.  Issues  to 
discuss  include  rules  against  price  advertising  as,  for  example,  by  professional  associations, 
consolidation of producers and distributors and government procurement. 
6.3.2.  The US  and EU agreed to involve developing countries more in the discussions. The 
freer trade environment adds  to world wealth but also reduces  the  influence  of governments.  The 
combined turnover of the two largest food companies  in the world, for example,  is  larger than the 
gross national income of more than 170 of the world's nations. Spending on their products last year 
was  equal to the gross national product of Austria, or represents 500 Belgian francs per person on 
earth.  The UN and  OECD codes  and the recent drafting by the  Clinton Administration of Model 
Business Principles for US multinationals reflect concern to introduce standards of behaviour for such 
powerful  actors  on  the  world  stage.  Tncs  generate  very  useful  income  and  their  investment  is 
welcomed by most countries but their economic power means that when abuses do take place,  the 
consequences  can be  serious.  Competing tncs  may  form strategic alliances  and  export cartels,  for 
example. 
6.3.3.  Governments increasingly lack the knowledge and power to control the activities of 
transnational corporations. The development of international competition policy is one important way 
to tackle abuses. The EU has developed a useful system via Articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty. The US 
applies  its  competition rules  extra-territorially and  the  Justice  Department has  just published new 
guidelines which suggest a further toughening of the US approach and a greater use of extra-territorial 
powers. Transfer pricing and corruption issues are not tackled by the EU-US  agreement but could be 
the next areas for control. The US  takes legal action against its citizens who bribe foreign nationals, 
for example. 
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6. 4.  Trade and Social Issues 
6.4.1.  Competition policy offers one route towards bringing social values into trade policy; 
negotiations  on  social  standards  another  and  complementary  one.  The  International  Labour 
Organization (ILO) lays down minimum standards in its conventions to be applied worldwide; respect 
for  basic human rights, prohibition of child and  forced  labour,  basic rules  on safety at work and 
health  protection,  freedom  of  workers  to  organize  themselves  and  conclude  collective  wage 
agreements.  The minimum standards recognize that wage  levels vary depending on what levels  of 
development permit. 
6.4.2.  The EU and the US share a strong commitment to human rights. Yet important parts 
of the ILO Conventions have not been ratified by either the US  or by particular Member  States. 
Discussions  in  the  OECD,  even  before  negotiations  in  the  WTO,  could  be  helpful  here.  The 
Ministerial Meeting of the OECD has in May 1995 mandated the organization to maintain its studies 
in this issue. The EU and US should give high priority to this work, which will lead to an extensive 
report in 1996. The US would like to see a WTO committee on labour standards and trade, to mirror 
that  on  Environment  and  Trade.  The  Deputy  Under-Secretary  of Labour  has  argued  that trade 
sanctions should be available as a last resort if core standards on child and slave labour were violated. 
6.4.3.  The Committee has previously expressed its opinion that the working programme of 
the World Trade Organization should include a "social clause". This should be based on Conventions 
adopted by the ILO -to which virtually all the world's countries belong - and particularly to those 
concerning: 
abolition of forced labour (Conventions 29 and  105); 
the right to organize and collective bargaining (Conventions 87 and 98); 
minimum age for work and the abolition of child labour (Convention 138); 
ban on discrimination in the workplace and equal pay as between men and women for equal 
work (Conventions 100 and 111). 
The question still to be debated is whether the ILO or the WTO should take the lead 
on this issue. The US  believes that the issue can be pursued in both arenas. 
6.4.4.  The US  and EU have hesitated to make trade conditional upon social standards but 
increasingly  in  the  1990s  basic  human  rights  requirements  are  being  tied  to  overseas  aid.  For 
example,  the US  government expressed disapproval of alleged human rights abuses  in Kashmir by 
cutting $24 million from a $1.4 billion aid package to India. Penalizing, for example, non-democratic 
governments has  had mixed results and France,  Canada and the US  have all decided to  downscale 
punitive action. Rewarding "good" governments with extra aid has been more successful, though not 
problem-free. The German government has recently increased aid to countries that have complied with 
"good government"  criteria and cut funding for  others.  Other donors have taken a more pragmatic 
approach.  GSP preferences are also geared to sometimes vague definitions of fundamental workers 
rights. Donors need to coordinate their actions and seek to develop clearer and more consistent policy . 
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6.4.5.  Developing  countries  need  to  be  reassured  that  the  EU  and  US  are  not  seeking 
minimum wage levels or trying to protect jobs at home.  Even if some of the poorer Asian countries, 
for  example,  raised  wage  levels  ten times,  the  EU  and  US  workforces  would  still be  far  more 
expensive. The declared US  aim is to set a floor to competition between developing countries so that 
those with low standards cannot undercut the others. 
6.5.  Consumer Protection 
6.5.1.  The  demand  side  of the  economy  is  just  beginning  to  be  recognized  in  trade 
negotiations.  Under  the  NAFTA,  the  Committee  on  Standards  related  measures  is  looking  at  a 
possible tripartite working group  to  examine  "methods  by  which consumer  protection,  including 
matters relating to consumer redress,  can be facilitated".  The EU is  working intensively on cross-
border redress within the Union, recognizing that consumer concern over redress when cross-border 
purchases go wrong undermines the Single Market. The US  is comfortable with the notion of cross-
border redress and might well be interested to pursue it in discussions with the EU, since foreign 
customers are already entitled to the same redress under US  law as  US  citizens -enforceable by the 
Federal Trade Commission.  Consumer  applications  for  redress  are  dealt with on the basis  of the 
location of the seller. 
7.  Some conclusions 
7 .1.  An expanded dialogue 
7 .1.1.  In  the  changed  environment  post  Cold  War,  the  EU  and  US  need  to  develop 
mechanisms for an extended dialogue on commercial, environmental and social issues. This should 
include both governmental and non-governmental contacts. For economic and social interests, and in 
the light of support received for  the  idea in the  US,  the  Committee  might consider a two  yearly 
exchange of  views on trade and development, commercial, social, environmental and consumer issues. 
7.1.2.  On the agenda could be: 
comparative experience of job creation, social issues and trade, vocational training, health, 
including antidrugs programmes, unemployment and other social care systems; 
progress on regulatory policy competition policy and model business principles; 
international issues such as relations with Japan and other countries with a significant role in 
world trade, promoting sustainable development and aid/food aid to the developing countries, 
the position of Africa, commitment to multilateralism, the contribution of economic policies 
to conflict prevention, international environmental agreements; 
problems of economic and monetary policy; 
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differences  in  agricultural  policies,  mutual  reductions  in  export  subsidies,  agriculture's 
contribution to the protection of the environment; 
environmental policy in the various sectors, lifestyle changes, information to consumers; 
innovative initiatives among NGOs, including civic, charity and voluntary organizations; 
cooperation  in  consumer  issues  such  as  cross-border  redress,  high  health  and  hygiene 
standards, prudential control and maintenance of services in rural areas. 
Officials could expand discussion on these issues too and on: 
Overseas Aid: 
Environment: 
Competition policy: 
The US  and EU should work together with Japan on a major  new 
initiative  to  increase  sustainable  development  aid  to  the  poorer 
developing countries. 
The EU and US should deepen both their efforts to control pollution 
at  home  and  their  commitment  to  international  environmental 
agreements.  The  WTO's  trade  policy  review  mechanism  should 
include an environmental overview of trade policies. Mechanisms for 
controlling  the  export  of banned  and  dangerous  goods  could  be 
discussed. 
Common action on competition should prevent restrictive practices, 
transfer pricing and abuse of dominant position. 
7 .2.  Towards a policy of pro-active multilateralism 
7 .2.1.  The EU must maintain its policy of support for a genuine multilateral system, but do 
so in a more proactive manner.  A strong EU is needed if the transatlantic partnership is to expand, 
this means that the EU must also have a coherent common commercial policy. This policy should seek 
to: 
*  ensure the effective implementation, by all Contracting Parties, of the WTO agreements and 
procedures; 
*  be pro-active in proposing the agenda for multilateral negotiations in the decade ahead. 
7.2.2.  In  order  to  help  promote  this  approach  the  Economic  and  Social  Committee 
recommends  that the  Commission report on the  "multilateral agenda  for  the  21st Century".  This 
report would  then  be  adopted  by  the  Council  and  discussed  with  all  the  EU's trading  partners, 
including developing countries.  It would require leadership and  thus  a need to promote the wider 
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interests of the EU and the multilateral system rather than defend the interests of individual groups 
within the EU. 
The impact of new regional initiatives 
7. 2. 3.  There is also a need to discuss the impact of regional agreements on the multilateral 
system.  The growth of regional agreements,  including a significant shift on the part of the United 
States towards regional approaches to commercial relations, necessitates such an evaluation. Studies 
have been undertaken by the  GATT and  OECD  on the impact of regional initiatives on trade and 
investment but these have not considered the wider effects of the US and other parties pursuing active 
regional approaches2.  The Committee therefore recommends further consideration of the impact of 
the growth of regional trade and integration agreements on the multilateral trading system. 
8.  Transatlantic Free Trade Agreement 
8.1.  The  idea  of a transatlantic  free  trade  arrangement  has  recently  been  raised.  The 
Canadian Prime Minister, Jean Chretien, recently suggested considering a general trade liberalization 
agreement  between the  NAFTA and  the  EU.  A  recent  speech by  Mr Jeffrey  Garten,  US  Under 
Secretary of Commerce for International Trade,  also suggested this option. The US-EU link is  one 
of the few which is not considering the establishment of a formal regional agreement. This suggestion 
requires careful consideration, since failure to conclude an agreement would undermine rather than 
consolidate the Atlantic Partnership and highlight differences rather than commonalities. A small but 
growing number  have  supported Mr Garten's idea,  including Lane Kirkland,  President of the US 
labour unions, and Clayton Y eutter, former US  Trade Representative and Agriculture Secretary.  In 
June,  Secretary of State Warren Christopher stated that the  US  will make  a serious analysis  of the 
issue. 
8.2.  The advantages of a transatlantic free trade area would be that it would provide an 
important political symbol of the continued commitment of both Atlantic partners.  At a time when 
both the US  and EU are seeking to redefine or define their roles in the world,  such an agreement 
would help consolidate existing strengths. 
8. 3.  The extensive economic interdependence that exists would also be underpinned by a 
formal agreement. Full market access could be facilitated in areas such as investment and negotiations 
are to take place in the OECD as described in point 6.4.2. Problems on the industrial trade front are 
not too great,  since tariff peaks  are  already  declining  in importance.  Differences  over regulatory 
policy could be resolved with a will and appropriate reciprocity. 
8.4.  The  "substantially all trade"  conditions in Article XXIV  of the GATT might prove 
an obstacle although the European Economic Area Agreement excluded most agricultural products. 
2  See also Committee's Opinion on Regional Stntcture of International Trade, (Rapporteur: Mrs CASSINA) Official Journal 
C 393 of 31  December 1994. 
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The  current share  of agriculture  in EU/US  trade  (between  2.5%  and  4%)  does  not  raise  major 
problems but in a free  market its share would rapidly increase.  Further, the US  would be unlikely 
to want to negotiate an  agreement that excluded agriculture.  There remain questions about such a 
strategy. 
8.5.  Could a free trade agreement be concluded which excluded agriculture? There are 
precedents for this, such as the European Economic Area Agreement. Although there are issues here 
concerning compatibility with WTO provisions on free trade agreements. Is there a willingness in the 
EU and  US  to  negotiate what might amount to  a  "Super Blair  House"  agreement?  Could such a 
bilateral agreement fnclude free trade in audio-visual products, given the fundamental differences that 
exist between the  US  and  EU  in that sector?  Could  a bilateral agreement  include provisions for 
investment or services which would add to what was negotiated in the GATS  or is currently being 
negotiated  in  the  OECD  on  investment?  And  one  might  argue  that  a  bilateral  negotiation  on 
agriculture would have less chance of success than a broader multilateral negotiation, which included 
a wider spectrum of interests. 
Regulatory cooperation as a first step 
8.6.  •  Given the risks involved in entering into a bilateral negotiation on a treaty with the 
US, the Committee therefore recommends  a more pragmatic approach at first which would help to 
focus  on common interests. This approach would concentrate on regulatory cooperation. It is in the 
area of regulatory policy, broadly defined,  in which most commercial disputes are likely to occur. 
This is illustrated by the cases of financial services at the end of the 1980s and the audio-visual case 
today. Future differences are also possible in the areas of environmental policy and social provision. 
In order to  address  these future  bilateral commercial policy  disputes,  it is  therefore. necessary  to 
identify the regulatory policy differences  and find ways of accommodating or eliminating them.  In 
this context, the launch of a transatlantic business dialogue is a step in the right direction. The hope 
would be that by the time this process had been concluded, the CAP will have been further reformed 
to accommodate  accession of the Eastern European countries. Such a bilateral approach would also 
help  to  ensure  that  the  respective  regional  approaches  developed  by  the  EU  and  US  can  be 
accommodated within a wider multilateral system of rules. 
8.7.  The Committee therefore considers that studies could usefully be undertaken of the 
major regulatory differences that exist in the EU and US, in order to identify potential difficulties and 
learn from each other's experience. These studies could form the first stage of a process of  regulatory 
cooperation between the US  and EU, based in the first instance, on cases in which there has already 
been some cooperation (technical regulations/mutual recognition, environment,  competition policy, 
information technology, labour market etc.). 
8.8.  Such regulatory cooperation should be inclusive, in other words it must consult the 
interests affected by regulatory policies.  Consultation should involve not only commercial interests 
but also consumers, trade unions and NGOs.  This would have the  added benefit of contributing to 
the  deepening  of the transatlantic dialogue,  which should also  be  developed  on  overseas  aid,  the 
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environment, social problems and consumer issues. The Transatlantic Declaration arranges for annual 
meetings between the European Parliament and Congress. The Committee could contribute to EU-US 
relations by meeting the economic and social interests of the US  on a regular basis also, building on 
the Transatlantic Business Dialogue. A future Committee Opinion on EU-US relations should consider 
how this might be set up. 
8.9.  Foreign policy and security analysts no longer dominate the debate between the EU 
and US; the experience of the recent years is that the bilateral relationship is now affected by a wider 
number of constituencies. Unless these are engaged in the dialogue, disputes over regulatory policy 
differences,  such as  BST, the audio-visual sector, telecommunications,  green house gases etc.  will 
continue to undermine efforts to develop the genuine transatlantic partnership needed if the US  and 
EU are to play an effective role in the world economy and international security. 
Brussels, 6 July 1995. 
The President 
of the Section for 
External Relations, Trade 
and Development Policy 
Roger BRIESCH 
The Secretary General 
The Rapporteur 
of the Section for 
External Relations, Trade 
and Development Policy 
Ann DAVISON 
of the Economic and Social Committee 
Simon-Pierre NOTHOMB 
* 
*  * 
N.B. Appendix overleaf 
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Table 1 
BASIC STATISTICS OF THE UNITED STATES 
Area (1,000 sq. km) 
(EU 15 
9,373 
3,234) 
Population,  1993 (millions)  258 
(EU 15  369.4) 
Number of inhabitants per sq. km  27.6 
Population, annual net natural increase 
(average 1986-91)  1,854,600 
Annual net increase, 
per cent (1986-91)  1.00 
Gross domestic product in 1993 
(billions of US  $) 
(EU 15 
GDP per head in 1993 
Gross fixed capital formation: 
Per cent of GDP in 1993 
Per head in 1993 (US$) 
6,343.3 
6,667.4) 
24,559 
13.7 
3,355.3 
THE LAND 
Population of major cities, including their 
metropolitan areas,  1991: 
New York 
Los Angeles-Anaheim-Riverside 
Chicago-Gary-Lake Country 
THE PEOPLE 
19,384,000 
14,818,000 
8,339,000 
Civilian labour force,  1993  128,035,000 
of  which: 
Employed in agriculture  3,074,000 
Unemployed  8, 726,667 
Net immigration (annual average 1986-91)  730,400 
PRODUCTION 
Origin of national income in 1993 
(per cent of national income): 
Agriculture, forestry and fishing 
Manufacturing 
Construction and mining 
Government and government enterprises 
Other 
1.8 
17.7 
5.0 
14.8 
60.7 
THE GOVERNMENT 
Government purchases of goods and 
services 1993 (per cent of GDP)  18.1 
Revenue of federal,  state and local 
governments,  1993 (per cent of GDP) 31.1 
Federal government debt held by the public 
(per cent of GDP), FY 1993  51.6 
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Composition of the 1  04th Congress 1994: 
House of  Senate 
Representatives 
Democrats  204  47 
Republicans  230  53 
Independents  1 
Vacancies  - - - -
Total  435  100 
.. .  I ... Administration: 
Congress 
United States 
EU- 12 
Sources: 
United States 
EU- 12 
Sources: 
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KEY FIGURES IN THE INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS FIELD 
Secretary of State 
Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs 
United States Trade Representative 
Warren Christopher, 
Richard Holbrooks, 
Mickey Kantor, 
Peter F.  Allgeier  Assistant US Trade Representative for Europe and the Mediterranean 
Senator Jesse Helms (R-NC),  Chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations 
Rep.  Ben Gilman  (R-NY),  Chairman of the House Committee on International Relations 
Table 2 
UNEMPLOYMENT 
(percentage of civilian labour force) 
1990  1991  1992  1993  1994 
5.5  6.6  7.4  6.7  6.0 
8.3  8.8  10.1  10.5  11.4 
OECD: Main economic indicators. 
Table 3 
CONSUMER PRICES 
(percentage change from previous years) 
1990  1991  1992  1993  1994 
6.1  3.1  2.9  2.6  2.7 
5.7  4.8  3.7  3.3  3.1 
OECD, Main Economic Indicators- Eurostat 
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Table 4 
THE IMPORTANCE OF TRANSATLANTIC TRADE IN THE GLOBAL CONTEXT 
Imports  Exports  Balance 
Bio ecu  1992  1993  1992  1993  1992  1993 
EU trade with US  86.8  86.3  73.8  84.1  -13.0  -2.2 
EU trade with  51.5  47.6  20.5  22.6  -31.0  -25.0 
Japan 
EU total  487.7  486.0  435.7  482.6  -52.0  -3.4 
US  trade with  75.2  92.0  36.2  40.1  -39.0  -51.8 
Japan** 
US  total**  413.9  505.1  340.3  391.2  -73.7  -113.9 
Japan total  179.5  205.5  261.6  308.2  82.1  102.7 
World total  2178.7  n/a  2107.4  n/a 
Source:  Eurostat (statistics prepared by Eurostat for the Progress Report on EU-US Relations of December 
1994, European Commission) 
** Source: Survey of current business 
us 
share of EU  17 
exports 
share of US  -
exports 
share of EU  18 
imports 
share of US  -
imports 
Table 5 
THE EU's AND US' PRINCIPAL 
TRADING PARTNERS 
EU  Japan  Mexico  EFTA 
Canada 
- 5  3  22 
21  10  30  3 
- 10  2  23 
17  18  26  3 
China  others 
2  51 
2  34 
4  43 
5  31 
Source:  Eurostat (statistics prepared by Eurostat for the Progress Report on EU-US Relations of December 
1994, European Commission) 
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United Kingdom 
Germany 
France 
Nether  lands 
Italy 
BLEU 
Spain 
Others 
I 
Germany 
United Kingdom 
France 
Italy 
BLEU 
Nether  lands 
Spain 
Others 
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Table 6 
EU TRADE WITH THE US 
BY Member StateS 
1993 
EU imports from the US 
EU exports to the US 
I 
24% 
21% 
19  % 
11  % 
8% 
6% 
5% 
6% 
I 
28% 
24% 
14  % 
13  % 
6% 
6% 
3% 
6% 
Source:  Eurostat (statistics prepared by Eurostat for the Progress Report on EU-US Relations of December 
1994, European Commission) 
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2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
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Table 7 
TRADE WITH THE US 
TOP TEN PRODUCTS IMPORTS/EXPORTS 
1993 
level  annual 
variation 
PRODUCTS  Bio  %  Extra-EU 
ecu  trade by 
products** 
EU's top 10 imports from the US 
Office machinery and computers  9.85  5.2  36.8 
Miscellaneous manuf.  goods  7.89  57.7  29.6 
Electrical machinery  6.69  20.7  24.1 
Other transport equipment  6.39  -25.1  43.0 
Power generating systems  5.96  4.1  43.9 
Precision instruments  4.94  2.1  48.4 
General ind. machinery  3.69  1.0  27.6 
Organic chemicals  2.43  -7.6  28.7 
Machinery for special ind.  2.37  5.9  25.1 
Road vehicles  2.30  2.2  9.9 
EU's top 10 exports to the US 
Road vehicles  7.97  54.8  18.9 
Power generating machinery  5.67  -9.5  33.1 
Machinery for special ind.  5.36  23.6  17.3 
Electrical machinery  4.76  27.1  15.9 
Other transport equip.  4.69  -3.7  20.6 
Miscellaneous manuf.  goods  4.67  10.9  21.1 
General ind. machinery  4.23  16.5  14.0 
Office machinery and computers  3.73  13.0  29.5 
Petroleum, petroleum products  3.55  27.1  25.5 
Non metallic min.  manuf.  3.42  18.7  20.2 
share in 
Trade with the 
United States 
%  % 
cumulated 
11.4  11.4 
9.2  20.6 
7.8  28.4 
7.4  35.8 
6.9  42.7 
5.7  48.4 
4.3  52.7 
2.8  55.5 
2.8  58.3 
2.7  61.0 
9.5  9.5 
6.8  16.2 
6.4  22.6 
5.7  28.3 
5.6  33.8 
5.6  39.4 
5.0  44.4 
4.4  48.9 
4.2  53.1 
4.1  57.2 
Source:  Eurostat (statistics prepared by Eurostat for the Progress Report on EU-US Relations of December 
1994, European Commission) 
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Table 9 
Table: FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT IN THE US 
Stock. valued at historical cost (book value) basis 
Year  Total ($bn)  EU ($bn)  EU as  % of Total 
1987  263.4  165.4 
1988  314.8  193.9 
1989  368.9  212.4 
1990  394.9  220.9 
1991  418.8  224.1 
1992  425.6  220.6 
1993  445.3  238.0 
Source: Survey of Current Business, August 1994 
Table 10 
Table: US FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT ABROAD 
Stock. valued at historical cost (book value) basis 
61 
59 
58 
56 
54 
52 
53 
Year  Total ($bn)  EU ($bn)  EU as  % of Total 
1987  314.3  124.0  40 
1988  335.9  131.1  39 
1989  381.8  161.0  42 
1990  430.5  180.5  42 
1991  467.8  199.4  43 
1992  499.0  207.2  42 
1993  548.6  224.6  41 
Source:  Survey of Current Business, August 1994 
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Table 11 
FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT POSITION IN THE US 
at Year-end 1993, in millions of dollars 
All  Petroleum  Manu- Wholesale  Banking  Finance 
Industries  facturing  trade  + 
Insurance 
World  445,268  32,647  166,698  69,720  31,026  65,696 
EU-12  237,647  24,226  104,252  25,932  12,619  32,002 
Belgium  4,589  d  1,879  983  d  -153 
Denmark  833  5  513  d  241  d 
France  28,470  60  16,937  1,880  2,004  2,153 
Germany  34,667  d  17,852  7,304  1,972  4,542 
Ireland  2,593  d  407  d  d  443 
Italy  1,229  127  439  507  542  -477 
Luxembourg  990  d  823  d  -5  113 
Nether  lands  68,477  12,424  22,856  7,713  3,537  9,707 
Spain  623  d  4  162  1,181  191 
United  95,415  9,367  42,543  6,934  2,123  16,919 
Kingdom 
EFTA  32,807  753  18,338  2,061  2,105  6,540 
Japan  96,213  254  17,746  34,754  9,803  11,837 
Canada  39,408  1,991  16,600  1,839  2,289  7,684 
Source: Department of Commerce,  Survey of Current Business, June 1994 
Note:  *less than $500,000; d= suppressed to avoid disclosure of data on individual companies 
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Real  Other 
Estate  industrie 
s 
28,609  50,872 
10,433  28,495 
61  9 
0  d 
47  5,389 
1,074  d 
128  d 
d  -116 
107  -250 
4,487  7,752 
d  20 
4,422  13,106 
417  2,594 
9,460  12,359 
4,691  4,314 
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Table 12 
US DIRECT INVESTMENT POSITION ABROAD 
at Year-end 1993, in millions of dollars 
All  Petroleum  Manu- Wholesale  Banking 
Industries  facturing  trade 
World  548,644 .  62,409  199,457  57,645  26,720 
EU-12  .  224,587  19,827  91,034  21,362  8,719 
Belgium  11,552  249  5,557  2,056  97 
Denmark  1,797  d  206  572  d 
France  23,565  973  13,257  4,733  364 
Germany  37,524  2,468  22,283  2,945  2,229 
Greece  424  d  125  60  d 
Ireland  9,575  d  5,122  159  d 
Italy  13,920  352  8,745  2,086  182 
Luxembourg  2,314  30  1,289  1  187 
Netherlands  19,887  1,055  7,775  3,090  131 
Portugal  1,162  d  340  266  195 
Spain  6,437  140  3,481  984  1,090 
United  96,430  13,802  22,855  4,408  4,122 
Kingdom 
EFTA  44,569  4,376  5,718  10,832  2,653 
Japan  31,393  5,429  13,610  5,859  309 
Canada  70,395  8,840  34,062  6,653  823 
Source: Department of Commerce,  Survey of Current Business, June 1994 
Note: d= suppressed to avoid disclosure of data on individual companies 
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Finance 
+ 
Insurance 
155,597 
66,517 
2,794 
363 
2,374 
5,107 
34 
3,389 
1,816 
753 
5,199 
127 
160 
44,401 
18,594 
4,780 
12,242 
Services  Other 
industries 
18,104  28,713 
10,803  6,326 
708  91 
113  20 
996  868 
862  1,630 
d  0 
684  52 
513  227 
d  d 
1,845  791 
145  d 
405  176 
4,447  2,396 
1,348  1,047 
740  666 
2,425  5,349 Rue Ravenstein 2  B - I 000 Brussels  Tel. 546 90 II  Fax 513 48 93  Telex 25 983 CESEUR 